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Abstract
ALGORAND is a celebrated public ledger technology designed by Dr. Micali
and his collaborators. By the end of year 2018, it has raised US$64 million in fund-
ing from venture capital firms. In this paper, we identify several design flaws of the
ALGORAND protocol. In particular, we show that the claimed (proved) fork-free
property is not true and several assumptions in ALGORAND are not realistic in
practice. The ALGORANDwiki page https://golden.com/wiki/Algorand
claims that “the probability of a fork in the protocol is estimated at 1/1,000,000,000
and therefore blocks can be considered final upon validation”. However, our first
attack in this paper shows that a malicious adversary who controls less than 1/3
of the users (or money units) could fork the ALGORAND chain very easily. Our
second attack shows that a malicious adversary could use a bribery attack to fork
the ALGORAND chain very easily also. Furthermore, we show that the celebrated
Byzantine Agreement component in ALGORAND is not necessary. The Byzan-
tine Agreement is the most expensive part and one of the most innovative parts in
the ALGORAND protocol. It is used to avoid forks in ALGORAND.We show that
a simple majority vote could be used to achieve the same property that Byzantine
Agreement achieves in ALGORAND under the same network assumption.
1 Introduction
In a digital society, it would be convenient to have a digital payment system or to have
a digital currency system. It is generally easy to design an electronic cash system using
public key infrastructure (PKI) systems. But PKI-based electronic cash is also easy
to trace. Theoretically, banknotes could be traced using sequence numbers, though
there is no convenient infrastructure to trace banknote sequence numbers back to users.
Banknotes thus maintain sufficient anonymity.
Several researchers have designed anonymous electronic cash systems. The early
effort includes Chaum’s online untraceable payment system [1] based on Chaum’s
blind signatures and Chaum, Fiat, and Naor’s [2] electronic cash that does not need
the bank to be online. However, these systems have not attracted enough interest from
the society and they have never been adopted. The situation has changed since the cryp-
tographic currency Bitcoin was introduced in the paper [6] by a pseudonym “Satoshi
Nakamoto”. Since 2009, the implementation of Bitcoin has been in operation and it
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has been widely adopted as one of the major cryptographic currency on the market
now. Bitcoin used Forth-like Scripts for writing smart contracts. In order to increase
the smart contract capability, Ethereum used Turing-complete programming language
Solidity for its smart contract design.
In the Bitcoin system, one can achieve system consensus under the assumption
that more than 51% computational power is honest. This “contradicts” the classical
results in Byzantine Agreement which requires at least 2/3 of the participants to be
honest for achieving consensus. However, Bitcoin has several inherent technical chal-
lenges. First, Bitcoin uses proof of work to generate new blocks. This requires a lot
of computation and wastes a lot of energy. Secondly, due to the enormous amount of
computational power and energy requirements, it is not profitable for regular desktop
computers to mine new Bitcoin blocks. Thus the major computing powers for Bitcoin
block generation are currently from a few mining pools (in particular, Chinese mining
pools control more than 75% of the Bitcoin network’s collective hashrate in 2019) and
the assumption of honest majority computing power may no longer be valid. Thirdly,
Bitcoin block chain may fork once a while. Thus one needs to wait for a few blocks to
make sure that her payment becomes permanent on the block chain.
The ingenious design of Bitcoin has inspired a lot of fruitful research. Several
researchers have introduced proof-of-stake or proof-of-“anything” block chain tech-
niques to address the challenges faced by Bitcoin. One of these celebrated results is
ALGORAND by Micali and his collaborators (see, e.g., [3, 4]).
ALGORAND works both in permissionless and permissioned environments. For
the permissioned environments, it assumes at at least 2/3 of the users are honest and
for the permissionless environments, it assumes that at least 2/3 of the money belongs
to honest users. Blocks in ALGORAND could be generated in less than 40 seconds in
experiments (see, e.g., [3]). The major techniques employed by ALGORAND include:
• A fast constant round Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocol
• A secret cryptographic sortition process to select a subset of secret users for the
Byzantine Agreement protocol
• The randomness entropy Qr for selecting the next round leader and the next
verifier set
• Player replaceability in each step of the Byzantine Agreement protocol
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, one of the major innovations of the AL-
GORAND is the use of an efficient BA protocol. Though it is a very efficient BA
protocol, it incurs the major computational cost in ALGORAND implementation. In
this paper, we show that there is no need for ALGORAND to use BA protocols. A
simple majority vote will achieve the same goal as the BA protocol under the same
assumption. There are several assumptions for the ALGORAND to work correctly.
Among these assumptions, the most important ones are: more than 2/3 of the users (or
more than 2/3 of the total money in permissionless environments) are honest and an
honest user will delete her ephemeral private keys after each usage. The authors of AL-
GORAND proved that under these two assumptions the probability for the block chain
to fork is less than 1/109 (it is claimed as 1/1012 or 1/1018 in the technical report [3]
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though). In this paper, we will show that under the first assumption, the ALGORAND
block chain may fork easily and we will show that the second assumption is not true
for bribery attacks. For example, a malicious user can use bribery attacks to fork the
block chain easily.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the major cryp-
tographic primitives for ALGORAND. Section 3 briefly reviews the ALGORAND pro-
tocol. Section 4 shows that honest majority users (or money) is not a good assumption
for ALGORAND since one can fork the chain easily under this assumption. Section
5 shows that the assumption that the majority individual users are honest is not realis-
tic for ALGORAND. Section 6 shows that Byzantine Agreement is not necessary for
ALGORAND.
2 Cryptographic primitives
ALGORAND uses a digital signature scheme SIG(·) that satisfies the uniqueness
property. Informally speaking, a signature scheme has the unique signing property
if it is computationally infeasible to find a public key pk, a messagem and two values
s 6= s′ such that
V SIG(pk,m, s) = V SIG(pk,m, s′) = 1
That is, both s and s′ could be verified as valid digital signatures on a single message
m using the public key pk. Uniqueness signature schemes are used for permanent
transactions on the block chain.
In addition to the uniqueness signature scheme, identity based cryptographic schemes
are used for message authentication during the block generation process and the private
keys for identity based schemes are kept ephemeral. Specifically, when a user i joins
ALGORAND, the user i generates a public master key PMKi and a corresponding
secret master key SMKi. The user i uses her long term uniqueness signature scheme
key to digitally sign the public master key PMKi. For each potential round-step pair
(i, r, s), the user i computes the identity based private key skr,si for the public iden-
tity key pkr,si = (i, r, s). This private-public key pair (sk
r,s
i , pk
r,s
i ) will be used for
messages authentication during the step s of round r. After these identity based pri-
vate keys skr,si are generated, an honest user i SHOULD destroy the secret master key
SMKi.
3 A brief review of the ALGORAND protocol
The initial status of the block chain is
S0 = {(1, a1), · · · , (j, aj)}
where 1, 2, · · · , j are a list of initial users and a1, · · · , aj are their respective initial
amounts of money units. We assume that each user i is identified by its public key pki.
That is, for the users 1, 2, · · · , j, their corresponding public keys are pk1, · · · , pkj . A
valid payment from a user i to a user i′ is in the format of
SIGpki(i, i
′, a′)
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where the user i currently has a ≥ a′ money units, i′ is an existing or a newly created
user, and pki is the public key of user i. The impact of this payment is that the amount
of money units for user i is decreased by a′ and the amount of money units for user i′
is increased by a′.
In an idealized magic ledger system, all payments are valid and the list L of sets of
payments are posted in a tamper-proof box in the sky which is visible to all participants
L = PAY 0, PAY 1, PAY 2, · · · ,
ALGORAND block chain is organized in a series of rounds r = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · ·. Sim-
ilar to the initial status, the system status for round r > 0 is a list of users and their
corresponding money units
Sr =
{
(1, a
(r)
1 ), (2, a
(r)
2 ), (3, a
(r)
3 ), · · ·
}
In a round r, the system status transitions from Sr to Sr+1 via the payment set PAY r
PAY r : Sr → Sr+1.
In ALGORAND, the block chain is a list of blocksB0, B1, · · · , Br where eachBr
consists of the following fields: the block number r itself, the set PAY r of payments
for round r, a quantityQr which is the entropy seed for round r randomness, the hash
of the previous block H(Br−1), and a set CERT r of signatures certifying that the
block Br is constructed appropriately
Br =
{
r, PAY r, Qr, H(Br−1), CERT r
}
.
It should be noted that in the ALGORAND protocol [3, 4], the field CERT r−1 of the
previous block Br−1 is not included in the hash H(Br−1). The field CERT r is a
list of signatures for the value H
(
r, PAY r, Qr, H(Br−1)
)
from at least 2/3 of the
members of the selected verifier set SV r for round r.
In ALGORAND, it is assumed that all messages are timely delivered in the entire
network. Specifically, ALGORAND assumes that, at the start of round r, all users
should have learned the current block chain B0, B1, · · · , Br−1. From this chain, one
can deduce the user sets PK0, PK1, · · · , PKr−1 of each round. A potential leader of
round r is a user i satisfying the condition
0.H(SIGi(r, 1, Q
r−1)) ≤ p
where p is a pre-determined probability chosen in such a way that, with overwhelming
probability, at least one potential leader is honest. Note that the underlying signature
scheme SIGi(·) satisfies the uniqueness property which requires that, given a message
m, it is computationally infeasible to find two different signatures on the message m.
Thus it is guaranteed that a user i cannot increase his probability to be a leader by
trying different signatures on the value (r, 1, Qr−1). Note that the user i is the only
person in the system that can determine whether she is a potential leader since she is
the only person that could compute the credential σri = SIGi(r, 1, Q
r−1). However,
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the user i can prove to others that she is a potential leader by releasing the credential
σri . The leader l
r is defined to be the user whose hashed credential is the smallest. That
is, 0.H(σrlr ) ≤ 0.H(σ
r
i ) for all potential leaders i. Furthermore, we also require that a
user i can serve as the leader in round r only if she has joined the block chain k blocks
before where k is a system-wide pre-determined parameter. That is, user i can serve in
round r only if i ∈ PKr−k. ALGORAND recommends k = 40 in [3].
At the start of round r, each potential leader i of round r collects the maximal
payment set PAY ri of round r that have been propagated to her. Then she computes
the candidate block without the certificate CERT r
Bri =
{
r, PAY ri , SIGi(Q
r−1), H(Br−1)
}
Next the user i uses her identity based ephemeral private key skr,1i corresponding to
the identity public key (i, r, 1) to generate the following message
mr,1i = (B
r
i , ESIGNi,r,1(H(B
r
i )), σ
r
i ) .
The user i then destroys her ephemeral private key skr,1i and propagates the message
mr,1i to the entire network.
Since there could be several potential leaders during round r, each user could re-
ceive several candidate block messagesmr,1i from the step 1 of round r. Thus we need
to select a set of verifiers to carry out the Byzantine Agreement protocol to determine
the actual leader lr and the corresponding block Brlr proposed by this leader. Specif-
ically, each step s > 1 of round r is executed by a set SV r,s of selected verifiers. A
user i ∈ PKr−k belongs to the verifier set SV r,s if
0.H(SIGi(r, s,Q
r−1)) ≤ p′
where p′ is a pre-determined probability such that the verifier set SV r,s satisfies certain
conditions required by the ALGORAND. For example, the authors in [3] recommended
choosing p′ in such a way that the size of SV r,s is approximately 1500.
In the step 2 of round r, each verifier i in SV r,2 determines that the user l is
the round leader if H(σr,1l ) ≤ H(σ
r,1
j ) for all credentials σ
r,1
j contained in the mes-
sages mr,1j that she has received. After verifying the validity of the message m
r,1
l =
(Brl , ESIGl,r,1(H(B
r
l )), σ
r
l ), the verifier i sets her initial value as v
′
i = H(B
r
l ). The
verifier i uses her ephemeral identity based private key skr,2i to compute the message
mr,2i =
(
ESIGi,r,2(v
′
i), σ
r,2
i
)
,
destroys the ephemeral identity based private key skr,2i , and propagates the message
mr,2i to the entire network.
From step s = 3 to step s = m + 3 (the authors in [3] recommended the value
m = 180), the users in the verifier sets SV r,s execute the Graded Consensus Byzantine
Agreement protocol to reach an agreement on the value v′i = H(B
r
l ). From v
′
i, one
can then determine the leader l and the corresponding candidate blockBlr proposed by
5
the leader l. If a verifier i determines that she has reached the agreement at step s of
round r, she would certify the block Blr by generating a message
mr,si =
(
ESIGi,r,s(bi), ESIGi,r,s(H(B
l
r)), σ
r,s
i
)
(1)
where bi = 0 if the candidate block B
l
r is not an empty block and bi = 1 otherwise.
The next block Br is finalized if the participants could collect at least tH valid
certificates mr,si of format (1) where tH is a pre-determined system parameter. Then
the user attaches at least tH certificatesm
r,s
i of format (1) as CERT
r to the blockBr.
In the case that Br is an empty block (i.e., PAY r = ∅), then the value Qr is defined
as Qr = H(Qr−1, r).
4 Honest majority assumption: Wrong!
In permissioned ALGORAND environments, it is assumed that at least 2/3 of the users
are honest and in permissionless ALGORAND environments, it is assumed that at least
2/3 of the money units are honest. Under these assumptions, it was “proved” that the
probability for the ALGORAND block chain to fork is at most 1/109.
In the following, we show that these assumptions will not guarantee the fork-free
property for the ALGORAND block chain. Indeed, it is very efficient for certain ad-
versaries who control at most 1/3 of the users (or money units) to fork the block chain.
Assume that the current block chain is
B0, B1, · · · , Br1 , · · · , Br
and the corresponding user sets are
PK0, PK1, · · · , PKr1, · · · , PKr
Furthermore, assume that 3|PKr1|< |PKr|.
The adversary A chooses to corrupt all users in PKr1 . Since |PK
r1 |
|PKr| <
1
3 , A is a
valid adversary in the ALGORAND adversary model. SinceA controls all users in the
block Br1 , she can begin to fork the chain from Br1 and construct a new chain
B0, B1, · · · , Br1 , B¯r1+1, · · · , B¯r, B¯r+1
where PKj = PKr1 for r1 < j ≤ r, PKr+1 = PK
r, the payment set PAY j for
r1 < j ≤ r consists of some simple transactions among the users within PKr1 , and
the payment set
PAY r+1 =
{
SIGpki1 (i1, i
′
1, a1) , · · · , SIGpkit (it, i
′
t, at)
}
where {i1, · · · , it} ⊆ PKr1 , PKr \ PKr1 = {i′1, · · · , i
′
t}, and a1, · · · , at are tiny
amounts of money units. It should be noted that this forked chain could be generated
very efficiently since the adversary A does not need to collect other transactions and
does not need to carry out Byzantine Agreement. All she needs to do is to find sufficient
number of users in PKr1 under her control to certify the blocks B¯r1+1, · · · , B¯r+1
which could be done very efficiently.
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The forked chain B0, B1, · · · , Br1 , B¯r1+1, · · · , B¯r, B¯r+1 is longer than the orig-
inal chain B0, B1, · · · , Br1 , · · · , Br. Thus the forked chain should be adopted as the
legal chain and the fork is successful.
The example in the preceding paragraphs shows that it is not realistic to assume
that the majority users (or majority money units) are honest. Thus it is important to
investigate other realistic assumptions for making block chains fork-free. Indeed, our
attack shows that for proof-of-stake based block chains, the users within the genesis
block can collectively re-build the entire block chain at any time. Thus we recommend
block chain techniques that use a combination of proof-of-work (or proof-of-something
that is hard to be efficiently done) and proof-of-stake. Ethereum is a good example of
block chains that will adopt a combination of proof-of-stake and proof-of-work.
5 Majority of individual users are honest: Wrong!
In ALGORAND, it is assumed that majority users (or majority money units) are hon-
est. In particular, it is assumed that all honest users will destroy the ephemeral private
keys after these keys have served their purpose. This assumption is not realistic in
practice. In the seminal work of Bitcoin, it is assumed that each individual user could
be malicious though an adversary may not be able to coordinate more than 50% of the
computing resources within the entire network. In a distributed environment (in par-
ticular, in a permissionless block chain network), it is not realistic to assume that an
individual users is honest. In a public network, we have to assume that every partic-
ipant is “curiously malicious”. In particular, if there is an incentive for an individual
participant to take a certain action, why would she refuse? For most users (if not all)
in the block chain network, they would take advantages of their leadership and verifier
roles if they were selected to serve.
In ALGORAND, secret cryptographic sortition techniques are used to select poten-
tial leaders and verifiers set in a secret way. That is, only the selected users learn the
fact that they are selected. The adversary does not know which users to corrupt since
she does not know who would be the leader and who would be the verifiers. However,
the adversary can provide sufficient incentives to ask selected leaders and verifiers to
publish their roles before they serve on their roles. In this way, the adversary could
identify the target users to corrupt before the protocol continues. Thus the leaders and
the verifiers would produce messages in favor of the adversary.
In ALGORAND, it is also assumed that honest users would destroy their ephemeral
keys after these keys have been used to authenticate corresponding messages. By re-
quiring this, the adversary will not be able to ask the leader/verifiers to fork the chain
from the previous block since the leader/verifiers do not have the ephemeral keys to
certify the block any more. In particular, it is mentioned in [3] that
“Roughly, once Br has been generated, the Adversary has learned who
the verifiers of each step of round r are. Thus, he could therefore corrupt
all of them and oblige them to certify a new block B˜r......We do so by
means of a new rule. Essentially, the members of the verifier set SV r,s of
a step s of round r use ephemeral public keys pkr,s to digitally sign their
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messages. These keys are single-use-only and their corresponding secret
keys skr,si are destroyed once used. This way, if a verifier is corrupted
later on, the Adversary cannot force him to sign anything else he did not
originally sign.”
Obviously there is no incentive for an individual user to destroy her ephemeral private
keys after the keys have been used. If she does not destroy her ephemeral private keys,
she may be able to sell these keys to the adversary later. Thus there is an incentive for
her not to destroy these keys.
In a summary, the assumption that the majority of “individual users” are honest
is not true in practice. Everyone in the block chain network would like to maximize
her benefit (why not?). The selected leaders and verifiers would accept bribery if it is
attractive enough. There is no incentive for an individual user to keep her leadership
role private. She would rather broadcast her roles before she serves on these roles
so that she could accept bribery. She would not destroy her private keys so that she
could sell them later. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of
the users in the entire network is not coordinated by a single adversary (cf. Bitcoin
assumption) though it is not reasonable to assume that the majority of individual users
in the network are not individually malicious.
6 Byzantine Agreement is not necessary in ALGORAND
In ALGORAND, Byzantine Agreement (BA) is used to reach consensus on the next
block Br and to avoid forks. Specifically, after the first step of round r, selected veri-
fiers in the set SV r,2 received multiple proposals for the next block Br from multiple
potential leaders. Every verifier i in SV r,2 selects the qualified leader li from the pool
of potential leaders by comparing their credential hash outputs, and extracts the can-
didate block Bri . Let v
′
i = H(B
r
i , SIGpkli (B
r
i )). At this stage, different verifiers in
SV r,2 may have selected different proposals for the block Br and holds different val-
ues v′i. Thus they need to use a Byzantine Agreement protocol to reach a consensus on
v′i (from which they can reach consensus on B
r). The BA protocol in ALGORAND is
based on the Graded Consensus (GC) and proceeds as follows where we assume that,
at each step, more than 2/3 participants are honest.
(A) Each user i ∈ SV r,2 propagates her authenticated value v′i to the entire network
(B) Each user i ∈ SV r,3 propagates the authenticated string x to the entire network
if and only if she received the string x from more than 2|SV
r,2|
3 users
(C) Each user i ∈ SV r,4 calculates (vi, gi) as follows:
• If she received the string x from more than 2|SV
r,3|
3 users during Step (B),
then vi = x and gi = 2
• If she received the string x from more than |SV
r,3|
3 users during Step (B),
then vi = x and gi = 1
• Otherwise, vi = ∅ and gi = 0
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(D) All users i ∈ SV r,s with s ≥ 4 execute the Binary Byzantine Agreement (BBA)
Protocol with the following input values: Each user i ∈ SV r,4 sets her initial
input value for BBA as 0 if gi = 2 and 1 if gi < 2.
(E) After the BBA protocol, each participant i outputs vi if the output from BBA is
0. Otherwise, outputs ∅.
From the above BA protocol, it is clear that the honest users agree on a non-empty
blockBr only if the BBA protocol output is 0 for all honest participants. This happens
only if at least one of the honest participants in Step (C) holds a value (vi, 2). Again,
this happens only if the first sub-step in Step (C) happens for at least one honest par-
ticipant. This means that at least 2/3 of users i ∈ SV r,3 in the Step (B) has signed
the block candidate Br. This again means that more than 2|SV
r,2|
3 users from SV
r,2
signed Br in Step (A). By these facts, we do not need to carry out the BA protocol for
ALGORAND to get consensus on Br. Instead, the consensus on Br could be reached
very efficiently as follows.
(a) Step 2 of round r: each verifier i in SV r,2 authenticates and propagates her
candidate block Bri to the entire network
(b) All users check whether she has received more than
2|SV r,2|
3 signatures for some
candidate block Br. If there exist more than 2|SV
r,2|
3 signatures for a proposed
block Br, then marksBr as the final round r block.
It should be noted that the above simplified two-step protocol will achieve the same
goals as the Byzantine Agreement protocol in ALGORAND. First note that if an honest
user determines in Step (b) that a block Br has been certified by more than 2|SV
r,2|
3
users in SV r,2, then no user in Step (b) will receive more than 2|SV
r,2|
3 signatures for
any other candidate blocks since there are at most
|SV r,2|
3 malicious users in SV
r,2.
This proves that no fork for the block chain will happen (this is the major goal for
the ALGORAND Byzantine Agreement protocol). Furthermore, our analysis in the
preceding paragraphs show that if ALGORAND Byzantine Agreement protocol would
agree on a block Br, then the above simplified two-step protocol would also agree on
the same block Br.
7 Other related Proof of Stake protocols
In the Sleepy Consensus Model (Pass and Shi [7]), a user i gets the priority to produce
the next block ifH(i, t) < pwhere i is the user identity, t is the current time stamp, and
p < 1 is a pre-determined probability. This Nakamoto-style protocol requires weakly
synchronized clocks and forks are created frequently. Furthermore, for malicious ad-
versaries, our attacks in Sections 4 and 5 work against this Sleepy Consensus Model
protocol also. It should be noted that, in the adaptive security model of [7], a user i
gets the priority to produce the next block if PRFk(t) ⊕ PRFk0(i, t) < p where k0 is
a random seed included in the common reference string and k is a secret key that the
user i has committed to the public key infrastructure.
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Kiayias et al [5] claims that their Ouroboros protocol is the first proof-of-stake
block chain protocol with a provable security. It is straightforward to check that our
attacks in Section 4 works against the Ouroboros protocol also.
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